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ABSTRACT

This study measures the change in political orientation and activism level of students at the University of California at Berkeley during the early 1970s. During this time students became more liberal on some items and less on others, and became much less active politically. Results suggest strong historical effects on political attitudes and activism levels but also indicate some effects of college attendance or maturation. Continuous students and dropouts changed almost identically, indicating little college impact. The ideological consistency of continuous students declined but that of dropouts did not. The association between political measures and students' conceptions of college as a center for intellectual growth or as occupational training is very high in 1970 and declines precipitously by 1973. A theory is presented that attempts to integrate these findings and the pattern of findings over several decades. It argues that the degree and nature of college impact on student's value orientations depend on the content of the popularly institutionalized theory of college as a center of intellectual growth. If such growth includes challenging traditional political precepts, college will liberalize students. If not, as in the early 1970s, college will not affect political orientation. (Author/IRT)

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Toward A Theory of the Political Impact of College: A Longitudinal Comparison of Students and Dropouts During a Period of Declining Activism*

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ABSTRACT

A panel study of students at the University of California at Berkeley is analyzed to show the impact of college on political attitudes and activism levels during the period 1970 to 1973. Since this was a "cooling off" period politically, it is hypothesized that this study may replicate the "non-impact" of college found in the 1950s, thereby forming one more point on a cycle of findings in the 1930s, 1950s and 1960s. This paper therefore analyzes these early 1970s data to exploit its special potential for developing clearer theory concerning the relationship between historical change and college impact. The paper first presents the results of the data analysis and then offers a theory of college impact on students' value orientations.

Findings include the following: between 1970 and 1973 students became more liberal on some items and less liberal on others, and became much less active politically. Comparisons with an earlier cohort which graduated in 1971, after attending college at the peak of radical activism, suggest strong historical effects on political attitudes and activism levels, but also indicate some effects of college attendanje or maturation. Comparisons between continuous students and dropouts show both groups changing almost identically, indicating little college impact. Continuous students are shown to change differently from dropouts in one regard -- ideological consistency declines during the period studied among continuous students but not among dropouts. This reverses earlier findings. Finally, the association between political measures and students' conceptions of college as a center for intellectual growth or as occupational training is shown to be very high in 1970 and to decline precipitously by 1973. It is argued that this fact may explain why ideology declined among students but not among dropouts.

A theory is presented which attempts to integrate these findings and the pattern of findings over several decades. It argues that the degree and nature of college impact on students' value orientations depends on the content of the popularly institutionalized theory of college as a center of intellectual growth. If such growth includes challenging traditional political precepts, college will liberalize students. If not, as in the early 70s, college will not affect political orientations. Implications of this theory are discussed.

The study reported here measures change in students' political orientations and activism levels during the early 1970s. The paper's goal is to develop clearer theoretical understanding of the ways in which attending college affects students' political value orientations. This issue juxtaposes two research areas paid considerable attention by social scientists. First is the question of whether students are changed in any way by the experience of attending college. Feldman and Newcomb (1969) review about 1500 studies which have attacked this problem. This literature focuses on the impact or lack of impact on students of the institutionalized social location "college student." The second literature, illustrated by Kenniston's (1973) review of over 500 studies conducted during the 60s, focuses on explaining radical activism among young people. For many of these studies, college student status is incidental, in that explanations are often historical or psychological, with colleges acting primarily as repositories for large numbers of young people.

The question of whether college attendance affects students' political orientations has been asked by numerous studies since the 1930s. Popularized by Newcomb's (1943) study of Bennington College, the central hypothesis of these studies has been that students become more liberal as a result of attending college. The overall findings of this line of research may be interpreted in two different ways. First, one may argue that students generally become more liberal and more interested in politics during college, although often by small margins (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969: 20-23 and Vol. II: 19-24). This view must however admit one major exception. In a review of college impact studies, most of which occurred during the 1950s, Jacob (1957) concludes that rather than liberalizing students,

college rounds off students' sharp edges, to facilitate their participation in the adult social order.

The second possible interpretation is that college impact on students' political orientations and activism levels depends in some way on the historical context. Studies conducted during the 1930s and 1960s show relatively consistent support for the hypothesis that college liberalizes students, while studies conducted during the 1950s suggest either that college has no effect or that it moderates political views. Given the nature of U.S. politics during these three periods, the possibility that college impact studies are tapping changes dictated by cycles of historical change is too logical to dismiss easily. Both the 1930s and 1960s were characterized by liberal national administrations, relatively high levels of popular radical activism, and rapid social change legislated through the political system. By contrast, the 1950s were touted as a return to "normalcy" and family life, and characterized by conservative politics, both active (McCarthy) and passive (Eisenhower). Hoge (1976) pursues the historical cycle hypothesis by examining religious and political attitude items replicated in 1952, 1968, and 1974 surveys of Dartmouth and University of Michigan students. Although he finds for some items a continuous liberalizing trend, for other items students are more liberal in 1968 than in 1952 but less liberal in 1974 than in 1968.

The interpretive issue posed by this pattern of findings is, then, whether changes among students are the result primarily of college attendance or of historical change. It is for this reason that the early 1970s provide an historical context of special value to theoretical work concerning college political impact. As Yankelovich's (1974) national survey of

students indicates, during the early 1970s student activism and student radical orientation declined. Although in many areas students continued to liberalize, campuses "cooled" politically, raising the possibility that the 1970s provide a test case by replicating one characteristic of the 1950s -- a decline in relative levels of liberalism and radical activism.[1] The 70s are not a replication of the 50s, but some reversals of the 1960's radicalization of students do occur in the 70s. We begin this study with the assumption that enough such reversals took place to allow us fresh insights into issues of historical change vs. pure college impact. This paper is therefore oriented toward exploiting the historical cycle occuring in the early 70s in order to shed light on the adequacy of existing theories of college impact on students' political orientations and activism levels.

Theories of Political Change Among Students

The great bulk of college political impact research has been descriptive, asking whether college students change politically, not why they change. There are, however, four main theoretical approaches to the question of why students do or do not change politically. Two of these are student culture approaches which suggest little connection between college as an institutional locus and the content of political changes among students. Each of the other theories specifies reasons why college student status should change students.

Student culture theory argues that the proximate cause of change among individual students is the content of the culture in which they participate. This approach claims that the culture of importance is truly a college culture, but reasons for assuming that something about college determines the content of student cultures are left largely implicit.

For example, Clark and Trow (1966) create a typology of student subcultures, each of which is assumed to take on its particular character through its attachment to academic or other aspects of the university. They go on to discuss a wide range of college characteristics which might help determine the content of such student subcultures, but they offer no clear theoretical formulation. Campus culture arguments generally begin with the content of the student culture as given and predict college impact along cultural transmission lines. Such arguments fail to clarify why college should change people in ways different from other locations spawning other subcultures.

Youth culture theory, the second type of cultural transmission explanation for political change among college students, is only tangentially relevant to college impact studies. This approach also locates the proximate cause of change among individuals with the content of the culture in which students participate, but that culture is not usually linked to college student status. The content of youth cultures is seen as determined historically or through some interaction of history and maturation. Cultural content may take its character from generational change and conflict (Eisenstadt, 1956; Feuer, 1969), from large scale, long term social change (Kenniston, 1970) or from the peculiar volatility arising from institutional designation of youth as adolescent throughout their school careers (Berger, 1971). These theories provide an ingredient often ignored by other college impact theorists: the recognition of historical causation of political change among students. They fail, on the other hand, to approach the question of key interest to understanding college impact: what, if anything, about the "college student" position in the social order leads students to change or not to change?

Each of the two remaining approaches to explaining change among students stipulates that particular qualities of universities and their social meanings lead to particular changes among students. The earlier of the two approaches, and yet the least specified, argues that broad liberal arts instruction opens students' minds, making them more libertarian, more open to change, and thus overall more liberal. This assumption is present but not well explicated in a great number of college effects studies, especially those emphasizing reduction in authoritarianism or ethnocentrism. Jacob (1957) treats it most fully with regard to politics and concludes with great reluctance that (during the 1950s) curriculum, teaching style and teaching excellence have little or no impact on students' political or other value orientations. The strength of this theoretical approach is that it posits a relatively clear cause of change in specific directions. The theory's greatest weakness, its intemperate equation of a particular educational ideology with "college impact," opens it to considerable negative evidence however. This paper will argue that the value of this approach becomes more apparent after considerable reformulation and after explicit recognition of historical change factors.

The most explicit available theory of college impact, the college charter theory, begins with the fact that colleges allocate individuals into elite social positions (Meyer, 1970; see also Kamens, 1971). The size and composition of the elite varies among nations, but even in the U.S., changes during college are expected to reflect the redefinition of students into college graduates -- persons of some relative standing in the adult community. Society-wide agreement about the nature of college education and its relation to the economy (allocation) give colleges and

universities the "charter" to produce elites. Students change as they become so defined. Meyer argues that students will therefore experience greatest changes in areas directly related to the college's charter -- e.g., occupational aspirations. In other areas, such as political values or activism, students will change to the extent that the institutionalized conception of "college graduate" includes political components. For example, Meyer and Rubinson (1972) show that in some South American nations where university graduation automatically implies membership in a rather small political elite, student activism is very high. College students are politically active because college graduates are political elites. But in the U.S. so many students graduate each year that even at the colleges which can sport photos of famous and powerful alumni, few students are likely to experience their college degrees as direct allocation into active political power. Thus, Meyer (1965) concludes that the preoccupation of college impact studies with value orientations, such as political liberalization, is illogical since value areas have no intrinsic connection with the status redefinition into college graduates.

In this view conditions external to the organization and culture of the campus but intrinsic to the university as an institution of the larger society determine the types of change students experience. This formulation has an advantage over the other three discussed here in that it both explicitly recognizes historical factors which determine correlates of elite status and also posits explicit reasons why status as college student changes individuals. For purposes of political change studied here, Meyer's approach is limited in that it suggests no reaons to expect change among U.S. students and cannot therefore explain periods of liberalization and increasing activism.

The review of these four approaches highlights three central theoretical issues. First, is it the social location "college student" as such which determines change, or would the individuals who are college students change in the same ways if they were not attending college? Second, are the effects of college, if any, relatively invariant, or do they vary with historical changes in the larger society? Third, are the effects of college, if any, direct effects of the immediate structure and culture of the college, or are students affected by belief systems institutionalized in the larger society and "activated" by jollege attendance? More specifically, are college effects self-fulfilling in that students oriented toward college as a locus of personal growth and change experience greatest change?

The research findings reported below suggest that college effects are indirect, through college related belief systems which do change historically, and that the degree to which college attendance activates college effects on political orientation depends on those institutionalized belief systems and therefore also changes historically. These findings support Meyer's approach most strongly, although elements of the other approaches can be usefully integrated with Meyer's in order to provide the most powerful explanation of our findings.

Research Design

This paper analyzes results of a panel survey of male students from one high status university -- the University of California at Berkeley.

In all, 960 randomly selected freshmen were interviewed in November 1970, after just over one month at Berkeley. Of these, 834 also responded to the second wave questionnaire in June 1973 -- three school years and two and one-half calendar years later. Among these students, 554 remained enrolled at Berkeley during the entire study and 117 left school and remained

out of school through the conclusion of the study. One hundred sixty-three other respondents either left and returned to Berkeley or transferred to another college. In order to isolate as uniquely as possible the distinction between continuous students and dropouts, these latter categories of students are omitted from the analysis.

A second available sample, drawn on only to a limited extent in this paper, includes males who were seniors at Berkeley during the 1970-71 academic year. Data were collected from them in March 1971 on the eve of their graduation, and again two years later in June 1973.

Generality of the results obtained in this study may be limited by the fact that they are based on males at one school. Both these factors also aid in simplifying interpretation of results, however. The bulk of previous studies were male only, increasing comparability between our findings and those previously reported. Also, because the single school studied here is highly selective, we can assume greater comparability to earlier studies of selective universities than would be the case with a broad sample of schools. The increase in the proportion of college aged persons enrolled in college has seriously altered the composition of student bodies at all but the most selective schools. Since one of our major concerns is unravelling historical effects on college impact, these characteristics of the sample provide advantages as well as liabilities.

Two other characteristics of the sample provide unusual opportunity to explore theoretical interpretations regarding college impact on political attitudes and activism. First, as mentioned earlier, the period spanned by the study is Fall 1970 to Spring 1973, the first period since the 1950s characterized by reduction of activism and liberalism. This historical

fact allows us to make progress toward untangling issues of historical change and pure college impact. Second, this study includes a comparison group, students who left Berkeley and remained out of college at the time of the second wave of the survey.

The existence of the dropout comparison group helps us avoid one of the frequently noted research design difficulties in this area (Barton, 1959; Astin, 1970; Feldman and Newcomb, 1969). To demonstrate that college students change over time, no matter how careful the method, does not indicate a connection between college attendance and the change observed. It could be that everyone is changing in the same ways, implying historical causation, or that all individuals who are college aged change in the same ways, implying effects of maturation or of maturation in conjunction with history. Even with longitudinal data, some comparison group is needed to clarify causal inferences. Such comparisons are complex because the decision to attend college or not implies so much about one's future life. Nevertheless, the panel design with some comparison group of non-students is the design from which most information may be extracted.

RESULTS

Overview

The aims of this paper dictate that we ask many different questions of the data and use many different questionnaire items to assess the answers. We are looking for patterns which elucidate general theoretical propositions. To center too narrowly on a particular analysis of a few indicators is to run the risk of completely overlooking so large a proportion of the pattern sought as to make it invisible. We begin by asking what changes in attitude and activism level occurred during this "cooling off" period

of the early 70s. Continuously enrolled undergraduates are then compared with an earlier cohort which attended Berkeley during the height of activism in the late 60s, and with members of their own cohort who dropped out after beginning school. Next, we ask whether the pattern of interrelation among political measures changes differently among continuous students and dropouts. In particular, do the attitudes and activism measures available to this study become more or less closely interrelated over time? This question is especially suited to analysis of historical vs. college impact on students' politics. Historically, radical activism declined during the 70s opening the possibility that, like Daniel Bell's 50s, the 70s will prove to be a period of declining ideology. Various political orientations may have become uncoupled from one another, and belief and action may have uncoupled.

On the other hand, college impact arguments, while seldom dealing explicitly with this issue, imply that college attendance produces coherent, internally consistent belief systems. "Enlightenment" usually includes some strain toward consistency, and even if individuals diverge within the free college atmosphere, interrelations among different indicators of political orientation should increase. Hennesey (1970), arguing that few persons in the American polity hold ideologically consistent attitudes suggests that to observe such attitude structures we must look to educated elites. The view that college defines such elites therefore leads us in the same direction as the enlightenment argument -- toward expecting students to form coherent, more interconnected belief structures. Further, we might expect that at schools noted for radical activism, such as Berkeley, liberal beliefs would become more closely linked to interest in politics

and to political activism. Supportively, Finney's study of Berkeley students from 1959 to 1961 finds increasing interrelations both among indicators of civil libertarianism and between these indicators and political interest (1974:227).

Finally, we ask whether students' conceptions of the college experience -- their adoption of one of the institionalized models of the meaning of college -- help explain the historical change in college impact on political orientations. After answering these questions insofar as possible, we propose a theory of the impact of college on student value orientations.

Change Among Continuous Students

We begin with the same question asked by all college impact studies: Do students' orientations and activity levels change significantly during their stay in college? The sample we use to answer this question is the same as mples normally available -- students who attend the school at both data collection points. Except to establish a descriptive framework, this paper places little emphasis on whether students actually change. In a period of increasing conservatism, zero change among students could represent a liberal impact of college, and of course changes among students could be paralleled by changes among non-students. We are, however, interested in the consistency of changes among students, and in the similarities of change between this and previous studies. If students changed in a liberal direction on all items, then it is possible that all items indicate the impact of a single factor -- college attendance. If students liberalized on some items and conservatized on others, the argument that unique historical trends change students is supported. Further, if students change most in areas such as civil liberties attitudes, where post studies most often

report significant college impact, our data are consistent with at least limited range college impact arguments.

To preserve space we do not present results of this analysis in tabular form.[2] Appendix A presents the wording of the 16 items analyzed and indicates mean T1 and T2 responses for each item. Using the test for marginal homogeneity, we learn that all but two of our measures show significant change, but that students became more liberal in some areas and less liberal in others. Using students' reports of their own political orientations, for example, we learn that twice as many students moved to the left as to the right during the study (ratio=2.05). Half as many came to identify with the new left as defected from it, however (ratio=.51). Among eight issue oriented, specific attitudes, students became more liberal in four cases, more conservative in three cases and did not change significantly in one case. The number of items which change in each direction depends in part on the particular set of items available in a particular survey and so cannot be interpreted in an absolute sense. The findings show, however, that in the early 70s students changed in both liberal and conservative directions, suggesting that studies of college impact which include no concept of historical change are probably uninterpretable.

We also find evidence consistent with the findings of previous research supporting college impact interpretations. Civil libertarianism has been the most consistent indicator of liberalism in these studies and has provided the most continuous support for the college impact thesis (Feldman and Newcomb Vol II: 19-23). Berkeley students in the 1970s apparently continued this trend. The survey included no traditional bill of rights items, but did ask whether several actions or statuses should be legalized. These

individual liberties items show greater liberalization than any other measures. Ratios of students who changed left to those who changed right for each measure are as follows: legalize homosexuality: 5.82; legalize marijuana: 3.92; legalize abortion: 1.53. Change was less consistent among other measures. There were marked shifts toward seeing women as disadvantaged, away from feeling responsibility to end injustice, and away from willingness to restrict cars to save the environment. Criticism of technology as dehumanizing did not change and there was a slight drop in concern for human rights over property rights.

Similarly, among measures of political involvement the most traditional measure of college impact studies, interest in political affairs, shows a small increase while more specific and behavioral indicators show precipitous decline in activism.[3] These results make clear that historical forces must be included in interpretations of student change, but also suggest that there may be college impact which liberalizes students in some areas. These same points may be seen more clearly by comparing these students with the 1971 senior class at Berkeley, which we will call the senior cohort. For nine of the original 16 items we are able to combine the strengths of cross-sectional and longitudinal designs by comparing the senior cohort measured in early 1971 to the freshmen cohort measured in late 1970 (the same historical period) and to the freshmen cohort measured in 1973 (nearly the same point in their college careers, as they have completed their junior year). If all change were historical, the two classes would be nearly identical in 1970-1971 despite their age differences. If all change were related to age or college experience, the two groups should be nearly equivalent when each has experienced approximately the same amount of college attendance, despite the difference in calendar year.

Table 1 presents these comparisons. Three distinct patterns emerge. First, certain measures illustrate the decline of activism. In some cases, the two cohorts were equal in 1970 and the freshman involvement declined. In other cases, activism was greater among the senior cohort than among freshmen in 1970, and by 1973 freshman activism declined even further. Here change during college leads the class of 1974 to diverge from their 1971 predecessors, rather than producing convergence as the pure college impact argument predicts. The calendar year, not age or school status, determines response.

(Table 1 about here)

The second pattern provides contrast by showing the freshman cohort converging with and then surpassing the senior class. The two examples of this trend are measures of support for individual liberties. More seniors than 1970 freshmen favored legalizing homosexual relations and marijuana. By 1973, however, the freshman cohort had greatly increased its support for these policies, so that they were significantly more liberal than the senior cohort. Here, either the senior cohort began college less liberal than did the freshmen, or they liberalized less during college.

The third pattern characterizes global self-reported political orientation. Here, the freshman cohort moved in the direction of the senior cohort, but remained significantly less liberal in 1973 than were the 1971 seniors. It seems reasonable that this global self-assessment changed in a way intermediate to the other two patterns examined, as it presumably represents some attempt to average subjectively meaningful components of liberalism.

While Table 1 clearly illustrates the importance of historical change it also implies that college attendance and/or maturation sometimes affect attitudes, either independently or in conjunction with historical change. We find therefore both a caution to previous studies which interpret student liberalization as the result of education (college attendance) and the evidence that something more than history determines change. This evidence makes it reasonable to move on to our next analysis, aimed toward isolating the effects of college attendance.

Comparison of Continuous Students and Dropouts

Since this survey followed up dropouts as well as continuous students, we can compare these two groups to see if the experience of attending college continuously during the early 70s led students to liberalize more than dropouts (or to conservatize less for items where the entire sample became more conservative). Using multiple regression where scale values permit and Goodman multiway contingency table analysis (see Davis, 1974) for dichotomous variables, we ask whether continuous enrollment affected T2 political orientations or activism levels, controlling for T1 orientation or level. The results of this analysis are quite straightforward so that again in interest of space they are not presented in tabular form.[4]

For 13 of the 16 measures, status as continuous student vs. dropout has absolutely no effect. It does not reach statistical significance and estimated Betas are both positive and negative, clustering close to zero. In the three remaining cases, the effect of remaining continuously enrolled in college is statistically significant (at $p \leq .05$) although the effect is small in each case. For two of these three, support for legalizing homosexuality and interest in national affairs, remaining in college has a

positive effect (Betas = .08 and .09, respectively). For the third, the belief that technology dehumanizes more than benefits, college attendance has a negative effect (Beta = -.07). That is, college attendance leads to more conservative T2 response. In short, this first analysis, employing no background control variables, shows for the most part no impact of college attendance, and no clear directional trend either among the three significant effects or among the non-significant effects.

Repeating the analysis including students' background characteristics as control variables changes the findings little. Controlling for mother's political orientation, father's political orientation, mother's educational level, father's educational level, family income, high school GPA, math SAT and verbal SAT neither raises nor lowers the effects estimated for 14 of the 16 political measures employed here. The two exceptions are that support for the legalization of homosexuality is no longer significantly affected by college attendance and the feeling of responsibility to work to overcome social inequalities becomes significantly effected by continuous enrollment (Beta = .10). Here, college students conservatized less rapidly than dropouts.

While this analysis suggests the possibility of small and perhaps inconsistent effects of college enrollment, the overall impression is that continuous students and dropouts changed in the same ways. This provides considerable evidence that during the period 1970-1973 being enrolled in college -- even in the notorious University of California at Berkeley -- had no impact on students' political orientations or activity levels.

The finding that college had little or no impact on student politics during the early 70s does not end the theoretical discussion about college

effects. We know that during some periods attending college does liberalize students and we know that those who choose to attend college are consistently more liberal than others the same age. These 1970s findings demonstrate that college does not always liberalize students. It appears that both students and non-students are "drifting" during this period rather than being differently pushed or pulled by their social locations.

Consistent with the drifting image, it is interesting to note that background variables have almost no impact on change in students' attitudes or activism levels in this study. For the majority of measures, none of the background factors tested significantly affects T2 orientation or activity level. The only background factors which regularly show (small) effects are parents' educational levels. Here, as in the case of college attendance, individuals' statuses simply failed to substantially affect attitude or ajtivism change. A great deal of change occurred, some in a liberal direction and some in a conservative direction, but everyone seems to change in about the same ways, regardless of status.

Change in the Structure of Political Belief Systems

We can learn more about the possibility that the early 70s were a drifting period by analyzing the interrelations among political variables. As argued earlier, the historical character of the 70s suggests that interrelations among political variables would have declined, while college impact theory implies that interrelations increase during school attendance. To test these possibilities, we ask whether political beliefs and activity levels are more tightly interconnected in 1970 or in 1973, among continuous students and among dropouts.

Acausal analysis of the structure of belief systems is not a highly developed area within sociology. The methods employed to test these ideas

are therefore crude, but they offer relatively clear interpretations. A correlation matrix of the interrelations among all T1 political measures was constructed to show the degree of interconnectedness among political beliefs and actions in 1970. The same set of correlations was then calculated for these variables at T2. By comparing each appropriate pairs of cells from these matrices, it is possible to calculate the number of cases in which the degree of interrelationship increased (the T2 correlation is larger than the T1 correlation) or decreased (T2 correlation is smaller.) The period of time spanned in this study is too brief to expect many statistically significant changes (although some occur) and the number of relationship pairs (120 unique pairs for 16 variables) is too great to allow tabular presentation of each. The approach taken here has therefore been to compare the numbers of relationships which increased and which decreased between 1970 and 1973. For the statistically minded, tests of significance were constructed by calculating the proportion of cases which increased and decreased and then applying the sign test to determine whether the proportion is different from .50 and whether proportions calculated for continuous students are different from those calculated for dropouts. For conceptual clarity, attitude and action items are analyzed separately.

(Table 2 about here)

Findings, displayed in table 2, favor the historical interpretation, as interrelationships among the political items we analyze decreased much more often than they increased. Considering first continuous students, 95 pairs weaken while only 15 strengthen. Both among attitude-attitude pairs and among attitude-activism pairs, the proportion decreasing is significantly greater than .50. Although many of these changes represent only minor random fluctuations, the preponderance of change in one direction

is evidence of decreasing tightness of the interconnections among these political measures. If we consider only those pairs which change significantly (.05 level), our conclusion is the same. In 31 cases relationships decreased significantly; in no cases were there significant increases. It appears that, as in the 50s, ideology has ended again.[5]

By comparison, changes in strength of relationships among dropouts do not follow the same pattern. While slightly more relationships decreased than increased among dropouts, the discrepancy is not large enough for the proportion decreasing to be significantly different from .50. Consistent with this, when we consider only those changes which are large enough to be statistically significant ten increased and 11 decreased. As shown in Table 3, these patterns are significantly different from those for continuous students. For every category of pairs except activism-activism pairs, continuous students experienced greater weakening of relationships among political variables.

In contrast to our analysis of levels of activism or liberalness, these results indicate a clear effect of college. The result is, however, anomolous in that changes are in the direction predicted by the historical end-of-ideology argument, but occur only for college students, as would be predicted by the college effects argument. It appears we are seeing evidence of an interaction between history and status as college student.

Changing Conceptions of College Education

At this point we have identified several pieces of the puzzle. We know that there are historical effects on students' political orientations but that history alone is not adequate to explain all changes. We know that the locus "college student" sometimes does and sometimes does not

affect students' political orientations. And we know that college sometimes has effects opposite those expected by college impact theorists. Perhaps most importantly, we know from comparing this study with work done in other historical periods that the type of impact or non-impact of college apparently varies with historical circumstances. Such a possibility necessarily takes us beyond the immediate college setting to the larger societal meaning system which varies historically. In particular, we move now to explore the relatioship between entering students' views of the meaning of college and the presence or absence of political effects of college on those students. We choose this approach because it taps institutionalized meaning systems, because it offers a conditional understanding of why college might affect political orientations at some times and not at others, and because there is a body of previous research to place present findings in context.

There is ample precedent to consider students' understanding of why college is valuable as an important variable in college effects studies. Yankelovich (1972: chapter 7) makes a great deal of the systematic political differences between groups he terms vocationally oriented and "post-affluent." (This latter label is in error, for the measure he refers to is a politicized version of the long-standing intellectual growth rationale for college attendance.) In particular, he reports that 51 percent of students oriented to intellectual growth but only 36 percent of vocationally oriented students respond in 1971 that they had become "less politically conservative" during the previous year. Supportively, Finney's (1974) study of students attending Berkeley one decade before this study shows that vocationally oriented students began college less liberal and also liberalized less during college.

These vocational and intellectual growth orientations are powerful predictors of students' value change during college because each represents

a full blown, institutionalized theory of the meaning of the educational experience. As such, students accepting one or the other view will seek out and be open to quite different aspects of the college experience. Vocationally oriented students experience less change toward political liberalness because they understand college as a means to status in later life rather than as a place which challenges traditional beliefs and identities.

The possibility of interest here is that the components of "intellectual growth" change over time, and in particular that challenging conventional political views was a central component of intellectual growth during the activist 60s but became less important by 1973. If this is true, one could argue that continuous student status had little impact on students' political orientations and activism levels during this study because politics had become uncoupled from the conceptual apparatus which directs value changes -- from the meaning of intellectual growth.

To test this possibility, the 16 political variables used throughout the study were correlated with two available indicators of what importance students attach to their university experience. As shown in table 3, both these conceptions of the importance of university education show dramatic decline in strength of relationship to political variables. Occupational emphasis and desire for high marks are associated with political conservatism. No indicator of whether students accept the intellectual growth theory of college is available, but one can assume that very low vocational orientation means nearly the same thing, as these two are the only major theories existing. At time one, 25 of 32 possible associations summarized in table 3 were significantly greater than zero. By time two, 28 of the 32 relationships had decreased -- 18 of them to a statistically significant degree. These decreases occurred among both activism and attitude measures. The entire

spectrum of political matters became dissociated from orientation to college during the 1970-1973 period. Among those who left college, this dissociation is irrelevant, which may explain why the interrelationships among political variables do not weaken as much for dropouts as for continuing students. For students, however, this dissociation presumably signifies a redefinition of the components of intellectual growth, a redirection of interests, and a consequent loosening of the interrelationships among political attitudes and activities.

(Table 3 about here)

It is impossible to demonstrate that the dissociation between political matters and students' conceptions of college is the reason why college attendance is not related to political change in this study. The data fit this possibility and the explanation makes sense theoretically, but this study must leave it at that. One other analysis may, however, be reported, as it shows another aspect of these findings consistent with this interpretation. Since past studies show students' conception of college to be a determinent of change toward liberal political orientation, we ask whether the same occurs in this sample or whether the dissociation of politics from conception of college vitiates such effects.

Tests of the effect of degree of vocational orientation on change in political orientation or activism show that in five cases low vocational orientation at T1 produces more liberal or activist orientation by T2. In the other 11 cases conception of college has no significant effect. What is important about these findings is that conception of college affects change for only five of 16 measures, and that these five are systematically different from the other 11. Referring back to our analysis of the relation between conception of college and political measures, we find that these five

measures tend to be the ones which do not become dissociated from theory of college during the study. The following summary is accurate for 15 of the 16 measures: if a political measure is significantly related to students' T1 conception of college and if that relationship does not decline significantly by T2, change in that measure will be affected by T1 conception of college; if a measure is significantly related to T1 conception of college but the magnitude of that relationship decreases significantly over time, then change in that measure will not be affected by T1 conception of college. This pattern is not mathematically necessary, although it is highly probable and makes good common sense. What is important about it is that is shows us why in this sample conception of college seldom affects political change. Such effect depends on a particular constellation of attitudes and beliefs, including political attitudes and conception of college. During the period 1970-1973, that constellation changed. By implication, one may argue that the difference between these findings and earlier findings showing conception of college consistently affecting political change is that in the earlier period conception of college was gaining or retaining its political meaning while in the early 70s, political meaning was ebbing away. This also is consistent with the finding that Berkeley students of ten years earlier (Finney, 1974) experienced increasing ideology while in our sample ideology decreased. All this leads us away from discrete causal statements (x affects y), and toward analysis of the interrelationships among many variables, and how the structure of those interrelationships changes over time.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Summary of Findings

This study finds strong effects of history on political change among students, as might be expected in this time period. Activism drops off markedly, some attitudes conservatize, other attitudes do not change distributions, and still others, especially those involving questions of individual liberties, show strong liberalizing trends. Comparisons between our freshmen cohort and a senior cohort who graduated in 1971 illustrate both the intervention of history (freshmen do not become just like seniors, indeed diverge from them in some regards) and the effect of age or college status (the two groups are not always alike in the same calendar year). Comparisons between continuous students and dropouts show that almost all change experienced by students was also experienced by dropouts, suggesting that at least among individuals of similar age and background, change during this period was not much dependent on institutional locus, but more a matter of historical drift.

While level of liberalism and activism do not change differently for continuous students and dropouts, the structure of those beliefs and actions do change differently. Among continuous students there is considerable reduction in the overall tightness of the cluster of political actions and attitudes we measured. Far more relationships weakened than strengthened during the study, indicating a decline in ideology. Among dropouts, this trend is significantly weaker. These findings indicate college impact, but in a direction opposed to expectations from the college impact literature.

The relationships between political variables and the reasons students give for valuing college also decline greatly during the period of the study. Degree of occupational orientation (as opposed to intellectual

growth orientation) is strongly connected to conservative political belief in 1970, but much less so by 1973. Among those political measures for which this relationship does not decline significantly, conception of college is related also to liberalization or change in activism. Among those measures for which the decline is stronger, no effect on political change is found.

In regard to the long term development of the college impact literature, these findings lead to one non-speculative conclusion of significance: in the case of political measures at least, the degrees and nature of college impact depends on the historical context. This conclusion is supported by the student vs. dropout comparisons and the cohort comparison reported in this study, by the cyclical nature of findings in the 30s, 50s, 60s, and now the 70s, and by fortuitous specific comparisons available with Finney's (1971, 1974) reports of political changes among Berkeley undergraduate males between 1959 and 1961. These findings suggest at the least that increases in political liberalization and activism are not intrinsic, automatic outcomes of college student status. This should not be taken to mean college never affects students' political orientations or activism. Instead, it means that the degree and quality of college impact depends on historical forces largely outside the sphere of university control, rather than on some invariant quality of college education.

Toward a Theory of College Impact on Student Values

At the beginning of this paper three major theoretical issues were identified: 1) Is value change determined by the social location college student *per se*? 2) Are effects of college, if any, invariant or do they vary with historical changes? 3) Are effects of college, if any, direct

effects of the immediate setting or indirect effects of institutionalized belief systems regarding college? No one study can definitively answer such questions, but the period of the early 70s has proved helpful in suggesting possible answers to these questions and some speculation is in order. This section of the paper offers a theory of college impact on value orientations which has grown out of the analysis presented, explicates answers suggested by that theory to the three issues posed above, and discusses implications of the theory for the area of college impact studies.

The Theory. Two conceptions of the meaning of college are institutionalized and available to all students. The allocation theory holds that one should go to college to learn job skills and get a degree, and thereby to get a good job. Students who accept this conception as the primary purpose of their college experience are termed vocationally oriented. The intellectual growth theory holds that college is uniquely able to broaden students' intellectual horizons, to teach the power of critical thought and to increase students' self-awareness and social consciousness. For some purposes these two popular conceptions are normative, but beyond that they are understandings about what college is and what happens to students there. The scientific, explanatory qualities of these conceptions is illustrated by the fact that two of the sociological theories reviewed at the outset of this paper -- chartering theory and liberal arts instruction theory -- very much parallel these popularly institutionalized conceptions of education. The explanatory character of these theories gives them power to define and thereby in part create the character of the college experience itself.

Political liberalism and activism, like other value orientations, have no necessary, immutable connection to the college experience. Nor

does either the credentialling or the intellectual growth theory necessarily include particular value orientation impact of college. Meyer (1965) shows why college credentialling should not produce automatic value orientation changes among students. Intellectual growth too, can occur without increasing political liberalism, although the connection seems more reasonable to Americans since these forces have long been believed associated. The energy of broadening intellectual boundaries could go into religious mysticism, inner explorations, drug use, political action, unlocking psychic powers, exposure to different cultures, and a long list of other possibilities.

While the particular areas of growth are not specified in the intellectual growth conception, the notion that values are to be assessed, challenged and perhaps changed is very much part of this conception. Students for whom college is primarily a period of intellectual growth are therefore likely to experience value change. Students who are vocationally oriented are less likely to experience value change unless, as Meyer argues, they change in areas directly related to their vocational future. For intellectual growth oriented students, the particular value changes most likely to occur will be determined by the content of the term "intellectual growth" which exists for them, determined by historical events in the society, by local concerns of the campus, and perhaps by private understandings.

At the outset of our study, in 1970, "intellectual growth" was heavily laden with political meaning. During the period of the study, the intellectual growth theory lost much of its relation to liberalization and activism. Thus, by 1973 college no longer had any political impact. Political change determined uniquely by student status occurs when such change is an expected part of the theory of intellectual growth and occurs primarily among those students who most accept that theory as describing the college experience.

During historical periods when intellectual growth or expansion has no publicly accepted political content, college attendance has no impact on political variables. This non-impact occurs for the same reason that in other historical periods college has impact. In each case impact or non-impact is determined by the content of the theory that college is a location for intellectual growth. Presumably the same would hold for value orientations other than political liberalism. As example, one could cite Jacob's surprise that students in the 1950s did not become more secular during college (1957: 54-57), a finding far different from the current state (Wuthnow, 1976). Reasons for historical cycles in the relevance of value orientations to student status lie beyond the scope of this paper. It is simply argued here that the mechanism through which particular value areas become coupled or uncoupled with student status is the changing content of the intellectual growth conception of the meaning of college.

Answers to theoretical questions. The view just presented offers clear answers to the theoretical questions posed early in this paper. First, are there value changes produced by the social location "college student?" Yes, but not quite in the same sense as normally thought. Intellectual growth and its concommitant value changes presumably occur outside the college setting, but in addition there is a special belief system which stipulates that college promotes intellectual growth. Many college professors and administrators attempt to create that reality on campus. Many student cultures assimilate intellectual growth notions. Many freshmen enter college believing that now they will grow especially rapidly. Since the intellectual growth conception specifies college as a center of growth, the status college student will produce value changes associated with intellectual growth. The effects of that status may be anticipatory,

beginning before actual college entry, and may continue beyond graduation, via the conception that one has become an intellectually alive person who reads widely and so forth. But whatever the temporal sequence, these are effects of individuals' college attendance.

The second question posed was whether effects of college are invariant (in particular whether college always liberalizes students). The affirmative impression is given by most college impact theorists, although largely through omission of any discussion of historical factors. The opposing possibilities are that college might change students' values in different directions at different times, or might have effects under some historical circumstances but not under others. The study reported here affords no comment concerning whether college impact may change directions under varying historical conditions. The students studied became more conservative on some items and more liberal on others, but so did the dropout comparison group. The theory proposed to integrate these findings and past research in the area indicates that it is very much possible for the direction of college impact to change. For example, if new forms of religious experimentation come to be associated with intellectual expansion, college attendance might make students less secular. In past studies it appears that college has produced secularism or had no impact. The study reported here does make clear comment about the possibility that college affects students' value orientations at some times but not at others. In the early 70s, college had no impact on political orientations. The theory proposed here specifies conditions under which college would be expected to affect particular value orientations in particular directions and conditions under which no effect would be expected.

The third issue orienting this paper's theoretical work is whether college impact is direct (e.g., peer influence, course content) or the indirect effect of institutionalized belief systems. Without denying the mediating direct effects of the setting (peers do, after all, influence each other), the theory posed here emphasizes institutionalized belief systems as the locus one must look to in order to explain the nature of college impact or non-impact on students' value orientations. This approach explains why some students change systematically more than others: they accept the intellectual growth conception of college education. It explains why college changed students' political orientations during the 30s and 60s but not during the 50s or 70s: the components of intellectual growth vary historically and the centrality of the intellectual growth theory may vary historically. And it helps explain systematic variation in the impact of college by region or type of school (e.g., religious or not) as these factors are capable of affecting the content of "intellectual growth" and the likelihood students will seek it.

Some comments on past theory. The theory suggested here employs elements of each of the four approaches discussed in the literature review section of the paper. Hopefully, it also adds something beyond each. Youth culture arguments have employed an historical perspective but failed to specify how a college culture might differ from that produced by 10,000 young people in any other setting. Student culture theorists have attempted to locate school related causes of student attitude change but have failed to account for historical change and have often looked too much at the campus itself rather than at belief systems concerning the campus. This has led them to explore mediating peer processes rather than to explain why college has unique effects. The theory posed here leaves open the

question of what historical factors determine the particular content of the intellectual growth theory but it offers much more focus than youth or college culture theories by arguing that conceptions of intellectual growth are the key to understanding value change among students.

The theory that college liberalizes students through their exposure to liberal arts education is seen in the formulation presented here as correct under certain circumstances but not others, and as correct for somewhat different reasons than normally proposed. When intellectual growth is conceived to include political liberalism and when a college strongly embodies in its curriculum or student/faculty culture the value of intellectual growth, attending the college may liberalize students. Students who come to the college oriented to intellectual growth will change. In addition, other students may be influenced by the curriculum or culture to accept the intellectual growth model of education and so to liberalize. In this latter case, the outcome is precisely that posed by liberal arts theorists. What such theorists fail to see is a) that this outcome occurs only under certain circumstances and b) that the outcome results more from the fact that college professors and students believe in an institutionalized conception of the college experience equivalent to the liberal arts education theory than from the reasons typically posed by such theorists (e.g., that requiring world history will broaden students).

The theory of college impact which is most consistent with the view posed here is Meyer's. He argues that effects of college stem largely from the institutionalized meaning of college and "college graduate", a status defined by colleges. Meyer emphasizes the credientialling impact

of college, to which this paper adds an analysis of the impact of college on value orientations of students. The two theories are therefore complementary.

Some Implications. The theory proposed here suggests ways of looking at the college impact question different enough from conventional views that some implications should be explicated. First, it has been noted frequently that change among students may not indicate an impact of college. This paper has shown that is indeed the case and also suggested a dynamic historical framework within which such studies may be assessed. Proponents of liberal arts education may wish to bolster their stance with evidence that college changes values in desirable ways, but the implication of this research is that any such statement not made contingent on historical factors is essentially uninterpretable. By the same token, non-historical statements that college does not affect values are equally indefensible.

Second, this view casts doubt on the traditional form of analysis used in college impact studies. The impact of college is said to be shown by any residual change after controlling the variable at T1 and after controlling all possible background factors of the individuals studied (Astin, 1970). Since the effect of college comes indirectly through institutionalized belief systems knowable by non-students as well as students, however, this residual model is testing only a specific type of college impact. Individuals who believe they are going to college presumably begin preparing to be the person college will want them to be. Thus, their T1 characteristics already reflect the impact of college. The only impact found by the post-entry residual method is an "acceleration" or directional change impact. That is, if students and non-students have already moved in the directions they probably will move after entry into college, the statistical control

for T1 beliefs will itself "predict" their T2 beliefs unless they experience more, less, or different change in a particular college setting than their pre-college changes predict. This presumably occurs, but to equate this effect with total college impact is erroneous. An eloquent example was reported by Feldman and Newcomb (1969, Vol. II:23). Data collected between 1958 and 1963 at eight west coast colleges showed the proportion of entering freshmen scoring highly libertarian to vary from 47 percent at Reed College to 1 percent across town at Portland State. With one exception -- San Francisco State -- each college stood in the same relation to the others at time two as at time one. Under traditional definitions of college impact, only San Francisco State had any impact on its students, despite the fact that at time two 70 percent of Reed students and 3 percent of Portland State students were highly libertarian.

By the same token the theory posed here explains the finding that those in college or graduated from college are consistently more liberal than those who do not attend college (Yankelovich, 1974). Both those who plan to attend college and those who do not are affected by their knowledge of the prevailing belief structure that college challenges one's morals, makes one more liberal and so forth. The decision to attend college may be affected by this knowledge, and that decision will lead college attenders to move toward liberal views (in the right historical context) and may move others to become relatively less liberal -- the other side of the coin of college impact.

The theory posed here also helps explain which types of colleges change students most (as measured under traditional assumptions). Astin (1972) reports that students are affected most by large private universities

and small special purpose colleges (e.g. religious schools). These are settings which have the power to accelerate or redirect the changes students prepare for. Why? Because each of these types of schools has great power to impose its own definition of "intellectual growth" on students. Large private universities tend to be prestigious universities. They draw intellectual growth oriented students and the imposing faculty and student body can powerfully affect incoming students' understanding of what is involved in intellectual growth. Wallace's (1966) study provides an example. Studying college impact at Stanford University, Wallace found tremendous "instantaneous" change between his pretest (before freshman orientation) and his wave-one questionnaire only days later. Much "college impact" had occured as soon as Stanford imposed its powerful view of the college experience on incoming students. Similarly, small special purpose colleges can develop tight cultures or special self definitions which are then passed on to newcomers more powerfully than is possible in pluralistic or non-descript state colleges and universities.

Finally, the theory proposed here explains why it is that students and non-students tend to change in similar ways, with students sometimes changing at a faster rate. Amost everyone "grows" intellectually, matures, expands horizons. Our shared conception of what this means leads us all to change similarly. Our conception of the particular importance of college education in this process simply leads college attenders to change more rapidly. As a perhaps humorous corrollary one could predict that <u>if</u> American universities continue to become more occupationally oriented and garner even more criticism of teaching quality, etc., it is possible that alternative institutions could arise to provide intellectual growth. In such an event,

the impact of college could become to conservatize and narrow students relative to non-students, as everyone would know that one goes to college for occupational training but to the alternative centers for personal and intellectual growth.

In summary, this paper proposes a theory which specifies a dynamic process describing historical conditions under which college attendance will or will not affect students' value orientations and which attempts to synthesize findings over several decades of college impact literature. The theory grew out of research on student political orientations in a most interesting period -- the early 1970s. These findings do not of course test the theory; the theory grows from the findings. But the cyclical nature of political change seen in the 70s allowed this particular research to become closely integrated into the theory building process.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 1970s hardly replicate the tenor of the 1950s, but the politics of the 1970s compare to politics of the 1960s in at least somewhat the same ways as the 1950s compare to the pre-WW II era. For example, Glock and Bellah (1976) depict the 1970s in the San Francisco Bay Area, a center of 1960s radical activity, by referring to alternative religious or other spiritual groups, alternative communities in rural areas, economic subsistence through arts and crafts work, groups dedicated to inner exploration and personal growth, and the return to families and traditional occupational pursuits.

2. This table is available from the author.

3. Some of these indicators are difficult to interpret as the T1 measure asked whether students "have ever..." while the T2 measure referred only to the last 12 months. The decline in activism is seen clearly, however, from the comparison that more students participated in the 1970 off year elections than in the 1972 presidential elections (31.4 percent vs. 11.3 percent). Ironically, the one activism measure which showed no significant decline is protest. It is probable, however, that most of the T2 protest is accounted for by the "people's park anniversary" demonstration. This in itself -- protest as nostalgia -- indicates the change in activism between 1970 and 1973.

4. This table is available from the author.

5. It is important to note that the large number of measures used in this analysis insures that the trend toward lower correlations by T2 is not artifactual. T1 correlations ranged from 0 to .62. Thus, while measurement error might produce lower correlations at T2 in a few instances there

are counterbalancing instances where correlations could only increase or show no change.

Appendix A. Survey Items, With Percentages of Continuous Students Liberal or Active at Time One and at Time Two.

Political Measure	% Liberal or Active* Time One	Time Two
Self-reported political orientation (liberal or radical; 1-4 on 11 pt. scale)	51.4	61.9
Optimism about American society's future (little or none; 1-2 on 5 pt. scale)	60.6	69.4
Identify with the new left (yes; 1 on 2 pt. scale)	13.7	9.0
Support legalization of homosexuality (strongly agree; 1 on 5 pt. scale)	34.9	66.1
Support abortion on demand (strongly agree; 1 on 5 pt. scale)	55.6	61.9
Support legalization of marijuana (strongly agree; 1 on 5 pt. scale)	32.1	58.6
Believe women are an underprivileged, disadvantaged group (agree or strongly agree; 1-2 on 5 pt. scale)	36.1	59.4
Feels personal responsibility to overcome social inequalities (very or fairly; 1-2 on 4 pt. scale)	62.2	44.6
Science and technology dehumanize more than help (agree or strongly agree; 1-2 on 5 pt. scale)	30.2	28.9
Property rights are as important as human rights (disagree or strongly disagree; 1-2 on 5 pt. scale)	62.0	63.2
Should restrict use of cars to help environment (strongly agree; 1 on 5 pt. scale)	52.0	39.2
Interest in national affairs (very or moderately high; 1-2 on 4 pt. scale)	32.8	33.0
Participated in protest (yes)	28.8	26.8
Participated in recent political campaign (yes)	31.4	11.3
Did community organization work (yes)	28.0	14.7
Worked for ecology (yes)	39.5	14.2

* The scale values comprising "liberal" or "activist" percentages are reported in parentheses under the description of each variable. Direction of scales indicated here refers to statistics used throughout the paper, not to the original questionnaire wording.

Table 1. Freshmen at Time One and at Time Two Compared to Seniors at Time One.

Political Measure	% Liberal or Active*			Tests of Differences					
				Seniors vs. Freshmen Time One			Seniors vs. Freshmen Time Two		
	Freshmen Time One	Freshmen Time Two	Seniors Time One	X^2	d.f.	p	X^2	d.f.	p
Political orientation	51.4 (N = 495)	61.1	74.0 (N = 937)	95.2	3	.001	35.0	3	.001
Identify with new left	13.7 (N = 532)	9.0	23.7 (N = 938)	19.5	1	.001	54.3	1	.001
Legalize homosexuality	34.9 (N = 495)	66.1	49.9 (N = 943)	49.3	4	.001	58.7	4	.001
Legalize marijuana	32.1 (N = 536)	58.6	44.9 (N = 971)	31.7	4	.001	59.0	4	.001
Feel responsibility to overcome inequalities	62.2 (N = 466)	44.2	67.8 (N = 936)	7.8	3	ns	74.4	3	.001
Interest	32.8 (N = 543)	33.0	43.3 (N = 976)	25.7	3	.001	21.5	3	.001
Protest	28.8 (N = 534)	26.8	54.8 (N = 979)	74.1	1	.001	125.9	1	.001
Campaign	31.4 (N = 538)	11.3	31.8 (N = 908)	.05	1	ns	92.6	1	.001
Ecology work	39.5 (N = 537)	14.2	73.0 (N = 978)	164.8	1	.001	543.4	1	.001

* Measures and values designated liberal or activist are described in Appendix A.

Table 2. Changes in the Strength of Relationships Among Political Attitude and Action Variables, Among Dropouts and Among Continuous Students.

Pairs	Continuous Students				Dropouts			
	Relationship:			Proportion which decreases	Relationship:			Proportion which decreases
	Increases	Does not Change	Decreases		Increases	Does not Change	Decreases	
Attitude-Attitude	4	3	48	.92*	22	0	33	.6*
Attitude-Activism	10	7	38	.79*	28	3	24	.46*
Activism-Activism	1	0	9	.9	2	0	8	.8
Total	15	10	95	.86*	52	3	65	.56*

* Proportion of relationships which decreased among continuous students is significantly larger than the proportion of relationships which decreased among dropouts (at the .05 level or beyond).

Table 3. Changes in the Strength of Relationships Between 16 Political Variables and 2 School Orientation Variables, Among Continuous Students

Conception of University	Relationship		Significant Changes	
	Increases	Decreases	Increase	Decrease
Importance of vocational training	2	14*	0	9*
Importance of high GPA	2	14*	0	9*

* The proportion of increasing versus decreasing relationships in this case is significantly (.05 level) different from 0.5.

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